The Federal Constitution and Its Application, 1789 to 1933 by Dodd, William E.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
James Goold Cutler Lecture Conferences, Events, and Lectures
1933
The Federal Constitution and Its Application, 1789
to 1933
William E. Dodd
Copyright c 1933 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cutler
Repository Citation
Dodd, William E., "The Federal Constitution and Its Application, 1789 to 1933" (1933). James Goold Cutler Lecture. Paper 12.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cutler/12
VOL. XXVII-No.5 AUGUST, 1933 
BULLETIN 
The COLLEGE 0/ 
WILLIAM and MARY 
in VIRGINIA 
cAl 
The Federal Constitution and 
Its Application, 1 789 to 1933 
WILUAM E. DODD 
Professor of History, University of Chicago 
FIFTH LECTURE ON THE 
CUTLER FOUNDATION 
Entered at the Post Oftlce at WUlIamsb1ll2 as second-elass matter. 
Issued January, February, April, June, AUl1ust, November 
t 
3.. 
The COLLEGE of 
WILLIAM and MARY 
in VIRGINIA 
The Federal Constitution and 
Its Application, 1 789 to 1933 
WILLIAM E. DODD 
Professor of History, University of Chicago 
FIFTH LECTURE ON THE 
CUTLER FOUNDATION 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND 
ITS APPLICATION, 1789-1933 
I. 
SINCE the acknowledgment of American in-dependence there have been three great 
crises. The first of these came after the 
pe,ace of 1783 when the total returns from 
exports were less each year than the interest on 
the debts incurred in the revolutionary strug-
gle. The only means of solving what seemed 
to be an insoluble problem was the adoption of 
a Federal constitution which might guarantee 
cooperation and even control over the unruly 
States. That crisis was ended, as all the world 
knows, in the series of compromises drafted in 
Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 and adopted 
in 1788. The second crisis came in the winter 
of 1860-61 when the lower southern states se-
ceded from a Union which all the thirteen old, 
and nearly all the new, states had agreed at one 
time or another to be· voluntary. The economic 
rights of the planters as well as those of the 
planter states were in jeopardy in 1860. Se-
cession seemed to ~e the remedy. But if seces-
sion meant ' the permarient closure of the Mis-
sissippi to the vast region above the mouth of 
the Ohio, there was apt to be war. Likewise if 
secession meant the loss to the North of the 
[ 3 ] 
commerce of all the tobacco, cotton and sugar 
states, there was apt to be resistance if not war 
induced by the industrial states. The then 
President concluded too early, as he later al-
lowed, that war, initiated on the part of a Union 
which had no right to coerce a state, was the 
only solution; and the second great American 
crisis took the form of civil conflict. 
The third dilemma is now upon us. I t is the 
reckoning day of all the industrial countries of 
the world, a crisis that grips everybody from the 
plains of Saxony to the hills of Minnesota; and 
war offers no solution. It is an economic tangle 
which involves all the winnings of modern 
civilization, a situation which, if not handled 
as courageously as that of 1787-88, is apt to 
move us all backward toward the primitive life 
in which our forebears lived two hundred years 
ago. Perhaps a closer scrutiny of the ways 
men worked out the first impasse, an honest 
review of the blunders of war and reconstruc-
tion, and an analysis of the present economic 
revolution may suggest moves and attitudes that 
might help the country out of the dilemma which 
covers the earth. 
II. 
To make the matter clear it must be recog-
nized that all constitutions and treaties are but 
[ 4 ] 
compromises involving interests, prejudices and 
social purposes of the parties concerned. There 
is nothing about a constitution or a treaty more 
sacred than the rights and interests of the peo-
ple concerned; and any concerted effort on the 
part of any group operating under a great social 
compact to take advantage of its partners and 
thwart the purposes of the agreement is hardly 
less reprehensible than an open crime. Men 
must be honorable if they would avoid catas-
trophe. In view of this obvious truism let us 
state briefly the purpose and the spirit of the 
Federal constitution and the plain understand-
ings of its great authors as well as its patriotic 
opponents. 
There was a situation in 1785-87 which led 
men to covert practices. The preliminary con-
ferences to the general convention of 1787 were 
themselves contrary to the spirit and the clauses 
of the old Confederation. And if the state 
legislatures had been asked in the winter of 
1786-87 to grant plenary powers to the dele-
gations that gathered in Philadelphia the next 
May, these powers would surely have been 
denied. The convention was authorized to 
amend the constitution of the Confederation. 
Instead it wrote a new fundamental law and, 
upon the prestige of the men who thus tran-
scended their powers, the states were asked to 
[ 5 ] 
scrap the old law and substitute an entirely 
new system. The stern necessity of the hour 
was their excuse. 
The next constitution involved three points 
which have significance for those of us who 
think of possible ways out of an even more 
exasperating complex-more exasperating be-
cause the unemployed could then go to the 
wilderness and live off the beasts, the fowls and 
the fishes, and because American men had not 
then lost their sense of personal dignity and the 
needful faith in one's ability to support one's 
self. The first of the great compromises agreed 
upon in Philadelphia was a balance of the states 
and sections in such a way that no group was 
supposed to be able to overbear another; that 
is, the Federal power extended to the point of 
cooperation but not to coercion. The second 
item of the agreement was that commercial 
arrangements might be fixed in the congress 
upon a majority vote, but such arrangements 
must not be allowed to become repetitions of the 
old British mercantile system (1660, 1663 and 
1673) which had been a major cause of two 
revolutions, 1688 and 1776. In the hope of 
giving the agricultural states some guarantee of 
this, three-fifths of the Negroes in the South 
were to be counted in the allotment of repre-
sentatives. Even more was allowed: the Care-
[ 6 ] 
linas and Georgia might import slaves for 
twenty years and thus add to the social power 
of that region. Any intimation of a tariff like 
that of 1828 would have defeated the whole 
scheme. With states rema~ning sovereign and 
the commercial instinct duly curbed, there re-
mained a third item in the agreement: powers 
not actually granted to the Federal combina-
tion could never be assumed and made operative 
in law. 
With these elements in the complex situation 
duly guarded, the new constitution was hast-
ened to the states about the middle of Septem-
ber, 1787. It was a momentous issue. George 
Mason, Washington's neighbor and co-worker 
through the revolutionary struggle, took his seat 
for Fairfax county in the assembly in Richmond 
in October and prevented a premature discus-
sion of the new constitution in order that the 
matter might go before the people of Virginia 
without prejudice next March. He wrote Wash-
ington every week. Edmund Randolph, gov-
ernor of the state, published a pamphlet which 
advised against adoption without serious amend-
ment. Patrick Henry restrained himself that 
autumn with great difficulty. In Pennsylvania 
Benjamin Franklin, next to Washington the 
greatest influence in the success of the Revolu-
tion and then governor of the Quaker state, 
[7 ] 
opposed adoption without amendment; and the 
people of Pennsylvania were more apt ~o follow 
their greatest philosopher than any other leader 
whatsoever. In New York George Clinton, by 
far the most popular of the chiefs of that state, 
agreed with Mason and Franklin. All these 
men had rendered such high services in years 
past that no one might discount their motives. 
Mason was in no sense a self-seeker; Franklin 
was in the last phase of his long life, and George 
Clinton, while more of a politician than the 
others, was far more than a demagogue. Vir-
ginia, Pennsylvania, and New York: If either 
of them failed to adopt, the Union was almost 
certain to fail. Moreover these were states 
with growing, expanding and democratic popu-
lations. About half the people of the country 
lived within their borders. 
, What Mason feared in the new constitution 
was the likelihood that the commercial states 
would re-enact the system which the English 
had tried to enforce since 1660-high tariffs on 
imports and domestic market privileges that 
would subject the agricultural states to unjust 
direct and indirect taxation. The master of 
Gunston Hall was equally fearful that the Fed-
eral courts would overrule state laws and ap-
prove the usurpation of powers by the Federal 
government not granted in the constitution. 
[ 8 ] 
• 
The idea of a great industrial belt with huge 
cities, absorbing the marginal savings of the 
country as London had done for England and 
the junkers, agricultural and industrial, were to 
to for Germany, was to him a nullification of the 
very purposes of the Revolution. A Federal 
government dominated by a privileged group 
would be a new British empire erected on the 
soil of democracy. Moreover, he was very fear-
ful of the consequences of the constitutional 
privilege of importing slaves the next twenty 
years. Like Jefferson and Franklin, he wished 
to abolish the institution, even though he 
owned two hundred Negroes. A wide-spread-
ing democracy with independent economic and 
social centres all over the country was the one 
hope of the future for him; a balanced economic 
system was the essential fact in American life. 
What the founders of the United States sought 
was a vast union composed of free, self-directing 
individuals. Nor had they arrived at this con-
clusion through personal or group interests. 
George Mason was one of the first thinkers of 
the time, entirely conversant with the history of 
the long English struggle for a more just social 
order. And Benjamin Franklin was of the same 
mind and immensely popular all over the world. 
Edmund Randolph, still the governor of Vir-
[ 9 ] 
ginia, and George Clinton, not to be overlooked, 
were also in accord with this philosophy. 
On the other side was George Washington 
who in 1765 broke with his patron, Thomas 
Lord Fairfax, and his near neighbor, George 
William Fairfax, the most powerful men in the 
Northern Neck of Virginia at that time, and 
showed Patrick Henry and Richard Bland how 
to defeat the Stamp Act. He and Mason, as 
I have indicated, worked together till the ad-
journment of the Federal convention. At that 
time the master of Mount Vernon and the one 
great military figure in the country, grown 
doubtful of the democracy he had saved, took 
the view that adoption of the work of the con-
vention immediately and without serious amend-
ment was the only alternative to anarchy. He 
was the only man in the South whose popularity 
was equal to a great conflict with Mason and 
Henry; he was the only man who could rival 
Franklin in the Middle States. He first grew 
nervous, then suspicious. When the eighteen 
members of the Pennsylvania legislature broke 
the quorum of their assembly (September, 
1787) rather than issue a call for a constitutional 
convention and offered a series of amendments 
on which they would cooperate, Washington 
wrote that Mason had probably counselled the 
revolt. When the Virginia legislature instructed 
[ 10] 
Governor Randolph to communicate with Gov-
ernor Clinton in order that those states might 
cooperate to secure desired amendments, the 
communica tion was pigeon-holed, and Wash-
ington was informed of the significant fact-
secret change of Randolph's attitude. Mason 
was left in ignorance of the changed position 
of the governor. When the master of Gunston 
Hall returned to his home there were reports 
that his efforts in the recent session to prevent 
plural voting of townspeople on neighboring 
freeholds and his attitude on amendments to 
the new constitution had made him very un-
popular, above all in the little city of Alexandria 
where Washington's influence was supreme. It 
was said that he would be mobbed if he appeared 
in the town. He accepted the challenge and 
spoke there before a large audience, arguing his 
case as only a great and disinterested leader 
could argue. Not a hand was lifted against him. 
It was clear that the long friendship between 
the master of Gunston Hall and the master of 
Mount Vernon, representatives of Northern 
Neck families whose chiefs had worked and 
fought together a hundred and twenty years, 
was broken. It was a near-tragedy. Both 
men were great planters and great slaveholders; 
and both of them were profoundly concerned 
with the fate and destiny of the country they 
[ 11 ] 
had done so much to create. The older of them 
hoped and worked now for better guarantees of 
democracy; the younger thoughtless of democ-
racy and labored incessantly for a great con-
solidated state. In the hope of counteracting 
rumors Mason wrote Washington that winter; 
no reply has been printed in their published 
works. Later Mason called in person at Mount 
Vernon; there is no mention in Washington's 
diary or letters of such a visit or a return courte-
sy. Both great men declined to run in Fairfax 
county for the Virginia constitutional conven-
tion; but Mason was elected without recorded 
effort on his part from Stafford county and 
Washington made invidious mention of the fact 
and of the rumor that Mason might easily have 
been elected for two other counties. Mason 
and Henry and Thomas Jefferson, then far 
away in Paris, wished the new constitution to 
be adopted but only on condition of its radical 
improvement; Washington, young James Madi-
son and John Marshall fought for adoption with 
or without guarantees, so there was no delay. 
I t was an honest conflict of the best men of a 
great day and a great state; and the decision 
of Virginia meant the success or failure of adop-
tion in the country. Few greater issues in 
modern history have been determined on the 
basis of more honest convictions. 
[ 12 ] 
When the convention met in Richmond the 
opposition in the state was increasing, although 
the Federalists were able to elect David Robert-
son, an avowed partisan, reporter of the debates. 
The battle of the giants began. The vital 
differences as to the social purposes of the con-
stitution sharpened. Madison and Marshall 
sneered at the thought of Federal coercion of 
states; they declared that no Federal court 
would ever dare to usurp powers over state 
courts; and there could be no danger of a new 
mercantile system under which the wide agri-
cultural regions of the South and West would be 
exploited. Washington was known to stand 
behind the brilliant young leaders of national-
ism. But Mason and Henry fought to the last 
for the ideals of 1776 and (the Morrises and 
James Wilson, of Philadelphia, having defeated 
Franklin's candidacy for a seat in the Pennsyl-
vania convention) turned to Clinton of New 
York for cooperation. They failed to delay 
adoption; but they secured agreement to a 
series of limiting amendments. It was only 
upon a margin of five votes that the great docu-
ment was accepted in Virginia, only upon the 
solemn understanding that the spirit of the law 
as well as the law itself would prevail-that is, 
no section would be countenanced in attempts to 
monopolize economic power for sectional or class 
[ 13 ] 
purposes. Governor Randolph had delayed 
messages from New York till the decision had 
been made and he had otherwise maneuvered 
against his former friends. As Mason went 
home in sorrowful doubts as to the future of 
democracy in America he wrote to a friend that 
Randolph was but another "Benedict Arnold." 
The friendship between Gunston Hall and 
Mount Vernon was broken forever. Since Wash-
ington replied to no letters and returned no 
visits, Mason did not appear to say farewell and 
God-speed to his life-long co-worker when he 
set out sadly in April, 1789, to take up the reins 
. of the great new American government whose 
pr-inciples were still thought to be those of 1776 
and whose influence was spreading over Europe 
like an irresistible · prairie fire with W a~hing­
ton's and Mason's friend, Thomas Paine, preach-
ing the new gospel in pamphlets that sold by the 
hundred thousand, including always the Vir-
ginia bill of rights-an American Magna Carta. 
III. 
The honest and able general of the American 
Revolution with a new congress before him and 
clever cabinet around him, including Jefferson, 
Hamilton, and the dubious Randolph, turned 
his mind to the more difficult task of directing 
[ 14 ] 
the course of politics over the widest area on 
which democracy had ever been applied. 
Neither Mason nor Henry could be induced to 
take seats in the senate; Willie Jones of North 
Carolina, the most powerful man south of 
Virginia, would never take office under the new 
regime; Franklin was then upon his deathbed 
in the city of "Brotherly Love"; and old Sam 
Adams looked on from Boston wondering wheth-
er the new power setting up in New York, April 
1789, was to be more coercive in economic 
matters than old England had been under 
the ministry of Lord North. The fifty-eight 
year old Washington, like William III of Eng-
land, tried to work the young idealistic Jefferson 
and the still younger and imperialistic Alexander 
Hamilton in the same team. On the other side 
of the Atlantic, where the American fate had 
been decided in Franklin's French treaty of 
1778 and again brought into doubt in the un-
welcometreatyof 1783, the revolution moved in 
rapid strides toward violent extremes. The 
names of Washington, Franklin, Jefferson and 
Paine were more compelling amongst common 
men than the names of kings or prime ministers 
had been in a hundred years. The eyes of the 
world were upon the little group that sat in New 
York the summer and autumn of 1789. 
[ 15 ] 
LaFayette sent the new President the key to 
the Bastille! 
The first trade act of the new regime was true 
to the great compromise. Its terms did not 
conduce to monopoly, as had been the case in 
most other tariffs till this day, but every sec-
tion labored for its share of possible spoils. 
The eight percent customs duty would yield a 
yearly income half as great as the interest on 
the hundred millions of war debt, state and 
Federal. Would direct taxes be paid by the 
citizens of states who could not bear their local 
burdens and by farmers who could not then 
sell their crops either in English or French 
markets? The prospect was not unlike that of 
1765-if heavy direct taxes fell upon all, what 
better lot than that which Bute and Townshend 
had decreed? N ei ther the optomist, Jefferson, 
. nor the mercantilist, Hamilton, saw a clear way 
to success; and without success the constitution 
would fail, like the League of Nations of our 
day. 
A year had not passed before semi-famine in 
France and the fears of war in other European 
countries had pulled down the bars against im-
ports into Europe. In two years the volume 
of exports quadrupled and in four years the 
modest tax on imports yielded an income eight 
times as great as had been expected. All 
[ 16) 
Europe was at war and so long as Europe warred 
the United States flourished beyond the imagi-
nation of the most optimistic: It was the oppor-
tunity of history-one of the chapters of acci-
dent which have so profoundly affected human 
affairs. Under a constitution of the most deli-
cate balances, and adopted with the most 
solemn guarantees against all sectional or class 
advantage, the application of the first tariff 
was delayed so that merchants of all the middle 
and eastern cities might take their enormous 
orders out of the warehouses before customs 
fell due-considerable fortunes thus given by 
governmental decree to scores of mercantile 
folk. The debts of all the states were added to 
the Federal debt and in the process many and 
flagrant injustices were openly allowed, with 
secret runners carrying the news of future 
action to prospective beneficiaries-other for-
tunes given to preferred folk. All the written 
evidences of the Revolutionary debt, then 
collected at low prices in a few hands, were re-
deemed at face value. Virginia had paid the 
largest part of her debt out of her own meagre 
funds at twenty-five cents on the dollar. Her 
people received no consideration from any of 
the above named moves. The continental cur-
rency was redeemed at one cent on the dollar. 
And finally the Secretary of the Treasury, boast-
[ 17 ] 
ing that a national debt was a national bless-
ing, set up the First National Bank. In this 
way order was brought out of the old chaos and 
American money was better than British sterling. 
It was a great era. Enormous incomes from 
unexpected exports; departments of the Federal 
system worked like departments of the British 
government; a bank of the United States func-
tioned like the Bank of England; and terrible 
wars all over Europe gave the markets which 
sustained the system. Washington could hard-
ly avoid boasting of the unexpected prosperity 
which looked out from every farm and every 
hamlet in the new nation. Gouverneur Morris 
intrigued in Paris against the French revolution-
ists to whom he had been sent as minister; 
Robert Morris speculated in bonds and stocks, 
lands and buildings; and John Marshall pressed 
a great lawsuit (himself a party to it) to compel 
the state of Virginia to return the vast Fairfax 
acres to English claimants, exiled tories of the 
Revolution. Could Virginia be compelled to 
take lands away from the soldiers who were 
making their homes on lands they had won on 
the battlefield? Was the treaty of 1783 to be 
made valid, a treaty as unpopular in young 
America as the Versailles treaty in Germany? 
There were many reasons for a patriotic 
President to pause in 1792. Had the consti-
[ 18 ] 
tution been violated? There was no clause to 
cover a National Bank. A citizen of South 
Carolina sued the state of Georgia for the face 
value of a paper bill and the Georgia supreme 
court denied the suit. Would the Federal 
Supreme Court go to the aid of the South 
Carolinian against a sovereign state? There 
was the solemn treaty with France of ' 1778 
under which American independence had been 
won. That treaty required the United States 
to lend all possible aid to Frenchmen warring 
against England. Would Washington observe 
the terms of a treaty which the constitution 
had made a part of the supreme law of the land? 
Hamilton, aided as few statesmen have ever 
been aided by adventitious circumstances, 
claimed all the advantages of implied powers 
and all the benefits of an amazing foreign trade, 
set up a wondrous speculation which enriched 
tens of thousands of deserving and undeserving 
men; and the First National Bank set the ex-
ample of sharp practices and fortune-giving 
which has operated in national banking till this 
day. But the fame of "the greatest Secretary 
of the Treasury in history" covered all, and 
financiers, as well as others innocent of history, 
cite the success of that day as proof of the 
bankers' right to profiteer. The spirit of 1776 
was gone. A group of privileged individuals 
[ 19 ] 
was beginning in the name of the new con sti-
tution what the three or four score men about 
Charles II had done under the mercantile policy 
of England; the Earl of Shaftesbury, Sir George 
Carteret, the two Berkeleys, and their kind, 
were not unlike Alexander Hamilton, the Mor-
rises and John Marshall. 
In middle Pennsylvania, on the banks of the 
Ohio, in Kentucky, Tennessee, and over most 
of the South men named their towns Paris, 
Versailles, Bordeaux, and the like. IrrNew 
England where men had formerly hated Britain 
with unparalleled animosity, the British were 
admired and the French allies hated; the South 
still hated Britain and admired the French. 
Washington said that democratic New England 
had turned aristocratic and the aristocratic 
South had gone wild with democracy. Would 
the great compromise last? When in 1793 the 
French Minister, Genet, asked the privilege of 
doing in American ports what Franklin and Paul 
Jones had done in French waters, Washington 
answered in the negative-violating the spirit 
and the terms of the treaty of 1778; and there 
was an outcry unmatched since April, 1775. 
The popularity of the President was eclipsed. 
A fame unmatched in modern history went 
under a cloud and there remained till the hand 
of death restored it six years later. The great 
[ 20:] 
general who had broken the British empire with 
the aid of France now gave assistance to 
British imperialists in their twenty-year war to 
break revolutionary France. The tide of democ-
racy in Europe and America was stopped: 
Napoleon put a master's hand on France; and 
the young United States of America enacted 
alien and sedition laws in harmony with English 
reactionary policy and contrary to the spirit 
of both Federal and State constitutions. Jeffer-
son had gone into retirement and Madison 
abandoned his great friend in the Executive 
Mansion. The young American democracy was 
ashamed of the radical creed of 1776. 
IV. 
Thirty years passed. There was another 
privileged group rising in the lower South. The 
New England inventor, Eli Whitney, had shown 
cotton planters how to profit from a new agri-
culture beyond anything that Hamilton had 
imagined from his mercantile and financial oper-
ations. English and American Christian minis-
ters were showing the poor heathen everywhere 
that they were naked and that they ought to 
put on cheap, gay cotton clothes. Cotton in the 
lower South quickly came to be what tobacco 
had been to ancient Virginia, arbiter of war and 
peace. George Mason, who had warned against 
[ 21 ] 
slavery, was silent in the family vault at Gunston 
Hall, and his great neighbor lay in a similar 
vault at Mount Vernon. Their contradictory 
fears and their warnings were no longer effective. 
Thomas Jefferson, an old man at Monticello, 
again urged the gradual abolition of slavery in 
Virginia, which must have meant abolition in 
Kentucky and Tennessee and a definite limita-
tion of the rising Cotton Kingdom. After his 
decease in 1826, his grandson fought the same 
fight until death silenced him. George Mason, 
Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Jefferson Ran-
dolph were about to become discredited figures. 
In the ambitious lower South there stood the 
ardent and able John C. Calhoun. He spoke 
the language of planter privilege and rallied a 
vast region from eastern North Carolina to 
western Louisiana to his side. In Boston there 
was the marvelous Webster, son of New England 
privilege but recently engaged in threats of 
breaking Washington's Union. He was as 
ready, if not as clever, as Calhoun to bend the 
national constitution to cover the interests of 
his set and section. Were the solemn promises 
of Madison and Marshall, supported by Wash-
ington, in the Virginia convention of 1788 ever 
to be applied? Was there no obligation to ob-
serve the spirit of compromise, remove the 
menace of privileged groups and make the con-
[ 22 ] 
stitution cover the purposes for which it had 
been written? 
When the decisive moment came, once more 
in Richmond, there gathered a hundred men and 
leaders, the ablest body of Americans that had 
sat down together since 1787. Madison was 
there. Marshall, who had lost his great Fair-
fax law suit because of Madison, was also there. 
They did not love each other. J ames Monroe, 
last of the '.'Virginia dynasty," presided. Little-
ton Tazewell was pointed out as the man whom 
President Jackson had snubbed. Abel P. Up-
shur, who talked the language of Darwin, repre-
sented Accomac county. Philip Doddridge, a 
close friend of John Quincy Adams, spoke for 
the Wheeling district and William O. Gordon 
of Albemarle stood strong for the Jeffersonian 
demand that slavery be gradually abandoned. 
Only once or twice in American history has there 
been a convention so important in determining 
the fate of the United States. If the Mason-
Jefferson ideal of the American constitution were 
revived, the Virginians would ally with the 
middle west and block the mercantile system 
which Webster, Pennsylvania, and the second 
United States bank represented and which was 
about to assume more of the character of a great 
monopoly than that against which Washington 
had gone to war in 1776. Thus the wide-flung 
[ 23 ] 
Cotton Kingdom, with its world market, warred 
against a new industrial realm which must rule 
the Union and dominate the domestic market. 
Virginia would decide. 
As the decisive day approached, · all the 
country looking on, Robert Taylor of Norfolk, 
advocate of the Jefferson policy, was compelled 
to resign; the misguided people of Norfolk de-
manded it. J ames Monroe, instructed by Lou-
doun county to vote for the same programme, 
recanted in a strange speech about the French 
revolution and retired from the convention; 
and curiously enough, having aided the cause of 
Calhoun in Richmond he journeyed to Wash-
ington to aid Jackson in discrediting the South 
Carolinian! Abel P. Upshur made the ablest 
speech of the whole convention for a privileged 
social order, on the ground that history proved 
that the law of the survival of the fittest must 
prevail; the slaveholders were the fittest-
Hamilton's "rich, wise and good" people. To 
abandon the decree of history was to wander in 
a social wilderness. The editor of the Rich-
mond Enquirer yielded his life-long advocacy 
of the gospel of Monticello and thus prevented 
the establishment of a rival party journal in 
Richmond. J ames Madison, worn with age 
and tired of bitter controversies, agreed with 
John Marshall as he had done in 1788, and 
[ 24 ] 
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caused the verdict to fall on the side of the cotton 
planters. It was the last great decision but one 
in Virginia history and the greatest of Virginians 
made the choice. Within two years the de-
parted sage of Monticello was denounced as a 
mere dreamer and Thomas Jefferson Randolph 
fought his last fight for gradual abolition. A 
new gospel was submitted for that of the Declara-
tion of Independence. I t was the work of the 
learned Thomas R. Dew who declared with 
Upshur that men must ever be governed by the 
privileged few, that slave-holding was the basis 
upon which the noblest social structure of all 
time was being erected. A carefully organized 
and stratified society would fix every man in his 
place and poverty itself would cease. The 
former cooperation between the farseeing leaders 
of the Old Dominion and the rising Middle West 
was definitely broken. The region that was to 
produce in two decades two of the greatest 
advocates of the Jeffersonian system, Abraham 
Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas, must seek 
allies in the unsympathetic commercial-industrial 
East. The votes of the Ohio-Illinois country 
would soon be numerous enough to grant the 
industrialists of the East a greater navigation 
and industrial system than any other country 
had ever endeavored to fix upon the masses of 
its people. 
[ 25 ] 
Andrew Jackson fought blindly his great bat-
tle with Nicholas Biddle, a second if less clever 
Alexander Hamilton, and at the end of a tem-
porary, speculative recovery from the drastic 
depression which had followed the fall of Na-
poleon, broke the power of centralized, exploitive 
financiering. With the collapse of the Second 
National Bank, depression, evident in the low 
commodity prices from 1818 to 1846, seized 
again the financial-industrial minorities; and 
bankruptcies, defaults, state repudiations from 
Mississippi to Michigan and from Illinois to 
Pennsylvania put scores of thousands out of 
employment and started again the migrations 
from East to -West and from the older South 
to the contested plains of Texas. The political-
economic map of the country was kaleidoscopic. 
No one could say whether the 1788 objectives of 
Mason and Franklin or the promises of Washing-
ton, M<l:rshall and Madison would finally prevail. 
In the lower South somewhat more than two 
million white folk, with "mudsills" of near two 
million slaves underneath their economic struc-
ture, demanded the privilege of governing the 
fifteen million people who composed the rest of 
the Union, and they urged anew the privilege of 
importing blacks from Africa. Ten thousand 
a year were smuggled into the cotton states; 
and the greater the number of imported Negroes, 
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the greater the number of representatives of the 
region in the national congress. As the bene-
ficiaries of slave importations raised their heads 
higher and more proudly in national assemblies, 
the beneficiaries of the growing industrial mo-
nopoly of the East demanded the concession of 
higher and higher tariffs in the hope of reaping 
greater and greater rewards from the American 
market. The two groups were coming to the 
mastery of their parts of the Union and one day 
the masses of forgotten men in the West would 
be compelled unwillingly to take sides and fight 
a bitter war to escape the consequences of a 
break-up of the Union. Thus the constitution 
was about to be captured a second time by one 
of the two minority groups whose leaders knew 
exactly what they wated. 
The issues merged into the inevitable conflict 
of 1860 when, after six years of bitter controver-
. sy, the old conservative Democratic Party, 
founded by Jefferson but controlled by the 
leaders of the lower South, broke into segments 
and gave the new Republican party a plurality 
of the popular, and a majority of the electoral 
votes. Forty per cent of the electorate thus set 
up the new regime; about twenty per cent of the 
same electorate talked secession as a remedy for 
their prospective ills. Abraham Lincoln knew 
little of that past of his country so necessary to 
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any statesman; but he was an able, honest 
leader of the rising Northwest, with seven and a 
half million white people unwilling to be gov-
erened by four million white people of the South. 
The Republicans called themselves the heirs 
of Jefferson. The successors of Calhoun were 
really the followers of Hamilton, a wealthy 
minority with trained leaders. Without await-
ing the inauguration of Lincoln and the con-
ferences and compromises that must have fol-
lowed, South Carolina seceded from the Union, 
as she had a right to do, and sent a committee 
to Washington to settle outstanding claims. 
She would take over her forts and appeal to the 
cotton; sugar and tobacco communities to join 
her in setting up an ideal nation, based on the 
philosophy of Upshur,_ Dew and Calhoun. It 
was to be the best government in the world. 
The masters of plantations and the philosophers, 
whom the plantations produced, were to speak · 
for and guide the masses of white men and both 
own and discipline the four million blacks, so 
much in need of discipline and control. Mason 
and Franklin and Jefferson had lost in the 
South. Would they win at last in the North? 
Abraham Lincoln thought of the constitution 
more in the terms of Mason, Franklin and J effer-
son than his unnatural allies, William H. Sew-
ard, Thurlow Weed and Simon Cameron, of the 
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industrial East. Never was a President of the 
Union in so difficult a position. Heeding more 
the words of Lyman Trumbull, Benjamin F. 
Wade and Zachary Chandler, all ignorant of the 
great traditions and the toilsome work of 
1776-1789, he made a hasty decision when he 
heard of South Carolina's unwise act, and gave 
warning to the Senate of the United States that 
no compromise whatsoever should be made, 
a decision which overwhelmed him with sorrow 
during the two years that followed. Elected 
on a margin of three per cent of the votes of his 
own section, he boldly declared against all 
compromise as if all constitutional governments 
were not compromises. On April 6, 1861, when 
Jefferson Davis, a hesitant secessionist, was at 
the head of a confederacy of lower Southern 
States, Lincoln renewed the decision of the 
preceding December, although only two mem-
bers of his three-factioned cabinet supported 
him in this second assertion of a kind of union-
ism the constitution did not sustain. Half 
aware of the story of modern times, which 
showed how many and terrible are the risks of 
war, he plunged the masses of people, nine-
tenths of whom were opposed to the coercion 
of one section by another, into the bloodiest 
conflict then known to modern history. But 
having gone so far on behalf of his western ideal 
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of national unity, he had no other course to 
.pursue. 
All the world knows the outcome; but not 
even historians know or appreciate the narrow 
margins or the fatal compromises on which 
victory turned. In the summer of 1862, the 
imminence of English recognition of the South 
was so clear that Lincoln freed all the slaves 
where he had no power to free them in the hope 
of satisfying Richard Cobden and his allies and 
at the same time embarrassing the enemy. It 
meant the abolition of two or more billions of 
southern property, in the event of victory- a 
performance which Lincoln and every member 
of congress, but one, had declared unconstitu-
tional in July, 1861. It delayed and defeated, 
however, the policy of the pro-southern English; 
and without the application of this "war-
power" the Union would almost certainly have 
been lost. The next and an even greater de-
cision came in the creation of a third national 
banking system. The most popular act of the 
whole Jackson era had been the destruction of 
the Second National Bank; and nothing was 
more unpopular in Lincoln's region in 1863 than 
the idea of a new national bank. But Federal 
bonds sold at such a discount in 1863 that 
Horace Greeley and Jay Cooke could urge men 
to buy them and make forty per cent net when 
[ 30 ] 
the war ended and their holdings were paid in 
gold. Bankers everywhere doubted the ability 
of Lincoln to win the war. Their interest in the 
cause was won, however, in the establishment 
of the third national banking system-a scheme 
which enabled men with margins of profit to 
organize banks in every city, purchase United 
States bonds at a heavy discount and then issue 
bank notes up to ninety per cent of their face 
value. Everywhere men doubled and quad-
rupled their capital the next three or four years. 
Financiers, American and European, thereafter 
lent a hearty support to the "greatest democrat 
of the age." Within ten years the bankers pro-
cured hostile legislation against state banks and 
gradually organized themselves into an associa-
tion which was able in the decades that followed 
to guide the savings of every section into the 
vaults of New York banks. Nor was there 
any strict governmental supervision of a system 
in which the surpluses of the whole Union were 
so deeply involved. The financiers had at last 
acquired a position in the Federal economy 
which far surpassed that of Nicholas Biddle 
and equalled that of the slaveholders in 1860; 
a great oligarchy without effective govern-
mental supervision-government once more of 
the "rich, the wise and the good." Within ten 
years nine-tenths of the United States bonds 
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that Jay Cooke had sold to the masses through-
out the Middle States and the West were safely 
lodged in the hands of men living in three 
Eastern cities: Boston, N ew York and Phila-
delphia. In like manner other securities found 
their places in the same vaults, and men who 
studied the art of speculation played a game 
which neither the Montagues nor even John 
Law of Great Britain ever imagined possible. 
The year which followed the enactment of the 
third national banking law, congress passed a 
tariff which practically destroyed foreign com-
petition in the sale of commonly used goods. 
The measure was so extreme that Lincoln de-
clared that he signed the bill only on condition 
that repeal should follow the close of hostilities. 
The British navigation policy of the 17th cen-
tury was completely matched. The constitu-
tion which George Mason had urged was obso-
lete. Nothing illustrates this better than the 
accompanying act which laid a heavy duty on 
southern exports, specifically forbidden in the 
document of 1787. As a sort of concession to 
the Government, the industrialists agreed in 
the tariff of 1864 to allow a sales tax on their 
output and a mild income tax on their swelling 
fortunes j there were two or three thousand 
war-made millionaires. Lincoln was assassi-
nated a few days after Lee surrendered and there 
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was little prospect of repealing the tariff of 1864. 
In 1868, the sales tax was abandoned while high 
tariff duties remained or were increased. And 
within four more years men simply ceased to 
pay their income taxes. Before 1880 the fin-
anciers and the industrialists were fairly united 
in a common national policy. As time passed 
all the greater industrial units were so associated 
that they either broke down domestic compe-
tition or were able so to control prices and mar-
kets as to compel minor competitors to take 
orders from their greater fellows. With the 
bulk of the national savings in three eastern 
cities and the controlling agencies of industry 
next-door neighbors to the bankers, there was a 
privileged interest too powerful for any President 
to oppose. 
The last great element in the picture was 
the railroads. In war-time their managers had 
reaped great fortunes like their banker and 
industrial brethren. During or at the end 
of the war, the Government granted hun-
dreds of millions of acres of the public lands 
to railway builders without retaining public 
control of their distribution. The lands were 
sold at a profit to immigrants or to easterners 
crowded by .depressions off their ancient home-
steads. In 1874 the great trunk lines organized 
an association at Saratoga which was designed 
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to give them a semi-mastery of transportation 
like that of the wool and the steel and the bank-
ing chiefs. As time passed the rising lords of the 
railways focussed the termini of all their roads 
in eastern CItIes. Cotton and pork and tobacco 
sold to Liverpool and London had to be shipped 
first to New York. And what tended to fix the 
rising monopoly of Manhattan was the building 
always of bigger and better ships-vessels of so 
deep a draught that they could not enter 
southern ports. The railway managers were 
making the public and corporate canals, and 
even the Mississippi River, useless. Industry, 
finance, transportation and shipping had won 
the war; its chieftains, unhindered with anything 
but futile popular outcries on the plains of the 
West and helpless wailing in the South, were 
the masters of a destiny undreamed of in any 
age. One needs but recall Commodore Vander-
bilt who borrowed a hundred million dollars at 
a clip in London, Jay Gould who stole a railroad 
which tied New York to Chicago, and Andrew 
Carnegie whose iron and steel stock deals 
astounded the men of his generation. The 
Union was saved; but there remained hardly a 
vestige of the constitution for which men fought 
so strenuously in 1788 and died by the hundred 
thousand in 1863-65. Five or six years after 
Lincoln's death, Chief Justice Chase reversed 
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a former decision and declared the greenbacks, 
which he had issued in 1862 to save the Union, 
unconstitutional. The bankers had demanded 
it. Although the volume of business doubled 
and sometimes quadrupled every ten years, the 
amount of money in circulation remained sta-
tionary or actually decreased. 
The new masters of the new United States 
hardly knew what they were doing; members of 
congress and representatives of the dynamic 
industrial life like John Sherman or Zachary 
Chandler, master of the Republican party, played 
the game with a fair degree of safety, because 
the westerners could always be stirred to a 
bitter hatred ofthe South and southerners always 
replied by voting "solid." A greater and an 
equally effective influence was the current of 
things in Europe. There Otto von Bismarck 
fought three successful wars in six years and 
united the broken fragments of historic Germany 
and set the new Germany upon its industrial 
course. Western farmers reaped the advan-
tages which wars always yield American agri-
culture and billions of dollars worth of farm 
products went to the then free European mar-
kets. But these wars and changing conditions 
coupled with the painful pro~ess of paying the 
cost of the Civil War, and aided by Jay Cooke, 
master manipulator of railway securities, 
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brought on the panic of 1873. Europe and the 
United States were in dire straits. But the 
English steamboats and the American railroads 
carried hundreds of thousands of distressed 
Europeans to the United States where the free 
farmsteads of the West attracted millions of 
unemployed folk each decade. The European 
savings of the immigrants, spent in transporta-
tion fares, in the building of cottages ori the 
frontier and the purchase of implements started 
the wheels of industry going again after each 
"cycle." The hordes of Irishmen, always leav-
ing the neighborhood of the hated English, 
settled in the industrial areas, worked at low 
wages and pushed the said wheels a little faster. 
It was the curious action and reaction of Europe 
that helped Americans recover from the effects 
of their titanic struggle of 1861-65. While 
European wars, American free lands and marve-
lous railways performed these functions, new 
and better machines hastened the process. 
Europeans had abandoned their old mercantile 
policies and accepted something like Adam 
Smith's free trade programme. Their markets 
were open to American products. American 
farmers, therefore, shipped wheat and beef, 
tobacco and cotton, in enormous quantities 
each year. The McCormick binder, the drill, 
the mower and other improved implements 
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enabled the newcomers, the poor New England-
ers in their western habitats and the older Middle 
West agriculturists to drive English and German 
peasant farmers off their lands and into mills or 
compel them to emigrate. It was one of the 
evolutions like that which took place on the 
Italian peninsula while the Roman republic 
was rIsmg. Hordes of small, individualistic, 
liberty-loving proprietors were spread over the 
vast plains of the upper Mississippi and Missouri 
valleys. But these men hardly knew the motor 
forces of the society of which they were parts; 
they gave little thought to constitutions and 
traditions which lay behind them. They were, 
therefore, the industrious victims of the economic 
system operating always from the industrial-
financial East and drawing off automatically 
the annual earnings in business profits or 
accumulated local bank deposits. The govern-
ments of states made efforts to conserve the 
rights of their citizens; but the United States 
and its courts steadily supported the interests 
of the privileged groups which had taken the 
place in national affairs that slaveholders had 
occupied under the old Federal constitution. 
Consciously and unconsciously the process went 
on. 
But Grover Cleveland, an honest if ill-
informed leader of enormous personal power, 
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broke into the picture. He thought to change 
the drift by reductions of the tariffs. He did 
not understand the loud western demand for a 
more flexible currency; he never for a moment 
associated in his states craft public lands, im-
migration, railway concentrations and the ex-
port of huge masses of cheap farm products. 
He thought in terms of individualism and even 
states rights, both invalidated by the civil war. 
There were three hotly contested national cam-
paigns: 1884, 1888 and 1892-one of the long 
and balanced crises of American history. In 
each of these Cleveland fought blindly for a 
better system and a more decent treatment of 
the "reconstructed" South. While he led these 
campaigns and won what was called the land-
slide of 1892, he fell, unawares, into the hands 
or under the influence of "high finance" in New 
York City. J. Lynde Stetson, chief counsel 
of the house of Morgan, was his most trusted 
legal associate. The victory of the masses and 
the mighty protest against the tariff injustices 
turned out to be futile. When the long era of 
declining agricultural prices, 1866 to 1893, had 
reached the point where wheat and corn were 
burnt in place of coal, and the frontiersmen could 
no longer retreat from the scenes of their ruin to 
fresh lands without cost, there was something 
of desperation; there was threat of revolution 
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III the land of the free. Cleveland chose his 
cabinet from old-stage conservatives and made 
Richard Olney attorney general at a moment 
when the first anti-trust law was about to be 
applied; and Olney applied it to striking laborers 
instead of nation-wide industrial conspiracies. 
The Pullman strike and its settlement, like the 
paper money and free silver issues, showed that 
the Democratic chiefs, who, like Arthur Pou 
Gorman, talking states rights and tariffs for 
revenue, were as ignorant of the history they 
were making as the Republicans had been in 
1870-76 when they drove all the eminent co-
workers of Lincoln out of their party. Great 
financiers and insurance officials took pains to 
contribute to the chests of both political parties; 
and both parties were not unmindful of the 
sources of promising gifts. 
V. 
In this age of disloyalty to the ideals of 1776, 
there appeared the famous young William J. 
Bryan of Nebraska, himself as ignorant of the 
history and tradition of his country as Cleveland 
had been in 1884. But he was deeply concerned 
with the .interests of the masses and a would-be 
follower of Thomas Jefferson. I t was a time of 
as great distress as that which followed the 
Napoleonic wars . There were farmers' alli-
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ances, knights of labor, protest meetings and 
armies of unemployed, although few men put up 
the plea that it was the business of the public to 
feed and clothe them. In 1892 Bryan won a seat 
in the national house of representatives from a 
Nebraska district, strongly Republican. In the 
house he made the most effective speeches of 
the decade against the "iniquitous" tariff which 
laid heavy duties on imports and compelled the 
country to maintain vast industrial and financial 
trusts. Two years later he broke with the 
Democratic administration when he espoused 
the cause of silver coinage at the ratio of sixteen 
to one with gold. He visited the states and cities 
of the restless West and South; he held con-
ferences on party policy; and he made overtures 
to the rising Populist leaders. When the Demo-
cratic national convention was about to meet 
in Chicago, there had already been a "bolt" 
from the Republican convention which had sat in 
St. Louis and nominated William McKinley, 
author of the tariff which had produced the revolt 
of 1892 and ally of privileged business; Mark 
Hanna was his manager and connecting link 
with the East. Cleveland endeavored to con-
trol his party and worked even with his bitter 
enemy, David B. Hill, Governor of New York, 
to that end. Members of his cabinet did all 
that politicians could do to stay the tide of 
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cnticism. Bryan was ruthlessly pushed aside 
in the Nebraska Democratic Convention by the 
agents of J. Sterling Morton, member of the 
Cleveland cabinet, and not allowed to go as a 
del ega te of his state to the Democratic National 
Convention in Chicago, the tone of which he 
had already done so much to fix. But Bryan 
appeared there, nevertheless, as the chief of a 
contesting group. It was widely known that 
the aged Lyman Trumbull, one of the few soci-
ally-minded political leaders of Illinois and 
revered as an intimate of Lincoln in his sena-
torial days, supported the young Nebraskan. 
When the test came, the convention listened to 
Bryan's protest and his criticism of the social 
philosophy of the day. It was the cross-of-gold-
and-crown-of-thorns speech, unequalled in 
American political conventions. The result was 
the seating of the Bryan delegates from Ne-
braska and the almost unanimous nomination of 
the thirty-six year old leader. An unparalleled 
campaign against the privileged economic heirs 
of the Union victory in 1865 followed. But 
for the expenditure of unprecedented sums and 
the artificial Palmer-and-Buckner ticket put up 
by men who "knew exactly what they wanted," 
namely, a small split from the Democratic 
ticket in strategic states, like Nebraska and 
Indiana, the ora tor of the Platte would have 
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been seated in the White House in March, 1897; 
and American history must have taken a dif-
ferent economic turn, a turn away from the 
industrial goal at which the country arrived in 
October, 1929. There had not been an equally 
important campaign since 1864; and to give 
the people a different turn of thought, Hanna, 
if not McKinley, welcomed the chance of war 
with Spain-war, patnotlsm, colonies; the 
United States was re-entering the complex of 
world politics, as an imperialist power. 
The McKinley cabinet was in harmony with 
the social drift of preceding decades. The gold 
standard was maintained; the tariff was raised 
once more; Bryan himself helped annex the 
Philippines and, in spite of this, waged a cam-
paign against imperialism in 1901. The gentle, 
easy-going, half educated McKinley held his 
own, only to be assassinated in September, 
1901, just after he had repudiated his life-long 
protective tariff creed; and the stormy petrel, 
Theodore Roosevelt, entered the White House 
and waged a campaign of publicity against 
"big business" that was bad, while he apolo-
gized for "big business" that was good. The 
oil and the pork monopolists were denounced; 
but the steel trust, the most anti-social of all, 
was defended. It was the age of the "muck-
rackers," and the country became intensely 
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aware of the drift toward economic ruin. How-
ever, nothing was done nationally till ex-Presi-
dent Roosevelt, angered at the conduct of 
William H. Taft, his own nominee for the 
Presidency, split the Republican party ' into 
halves in Chicago in June, 1912. With two 
Republican candidates in the field, Woodrow 
Wilson, energetic pedagogue, moved straight 
toward Sixteenth Street and Pennsylvania Ave-
nue. 
Wilson was the first highly educated man and 
acknowledged thinker who had sat in the Presi-
dent's chair since John Quincy Adams, 1829; 
he was aware of the economic dangers ahead. 
He had, however, received only forty-one per 
cent of the popular vote. His cabinet was not 
composed of highly trained men, though first 
and last two masterful leaders of more than ordi-
nary abilities sat on one side or the other of his 
official table. There was a return to the semi-
free trade policy of 1846; the masterful associa-
tion of national bankers, unhindered in their 
exploitive operations since their beginnings in 
1863, was compelled to accept some govern-
mental control under the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem of 1913; and there was some effort to apply 
the trust regulation ordered in the law of 1890. 
It was an acknowledgment that the country 
Ipd not been administered in harmony with the 
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spmt under which the constitution had been 
adopted. The nation that had succeeded the 
old Union in 1865 was now an articulated society, 
not unlike the old South, but the majority of 
men were unwilling to accept order and subordi-
nation. The new society in which the new 
masters held seats on the directorates of great 
trusts, great banks and even greater railroads 
was an under-cover aristocracy. Next to the 
President of the country, these industrial-
financial men offered the social patterns of the 
time. When J. P. Morgan anchored his yacht 
in the Thames, even the King of England took 
notice. Andrew Carnegie had free access to 
the Kaiser in Berlin; and the Popes were not so 
near the throne of Heaven itself tha tthey would 
not grant a friendly audience when an American 
magnate appeared in the Holy City. Wilson 
was the first President in half a century who did 
not swing the doors of the Executive Mansion 
wide open when a Harriman or a Hill halted his 
car or carriage at the Executive gate. Next to 
the really great were the chiefs of organized 
labor, able to fix the hours of urban toil as the 
steel trust fixed the prices of its output. While 
they were not "in society," they were socially 
important; they were natural products of in-
dustrial monopoly. Below these were the 
masses of urban folk moving inevitably towarsl 
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proletarianism like their predecessors in ancient 
Rome, and the then greater masses of farmers 
and tenants making their painful way back to 
the peasantry of their mediaeval forebears. 
The American nation, though not willing to 
acknowledge the fact, was moving rapidly to-
ward the European status from which its 
founders had run away. Under the constitu-
tion which Lincoln thought he had saved, the 
people of the Wilson era were moving toward 
social goals which only a minority of the Hamil-
ton party would have tolerated in 1789. The 
three million farmer-folk who had started the 
western world on the road of revolution had 
grown to a hundred million, whose leaders had 
worked their constitutions, state, and national 
and city, into the most conservative frames of 
government in the western world. 
Wilson had hardly started his scheme of res-
toration when the imminence of war in Europe 
gave notice that modern states are intimately 
connected. He sent the silent Edward M. 
House to Berlin to persuade men that war was 
no longer a solution to economic problems. 
The gentle Texan, author of a twentieth century 
Utopia which at that moment enraged senators 
and industrialists in his own country, found 
Germany domineered by a combination of 
agricultural junkers, not unlike the southern 
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slaveholders of 1860, and industrial financial 
overlords, economic cousins to the masters of 
the United States. At the top of the structure 
sat the militarists ready to give the signal for 
war upon the drop of the right hat. For an 
hour the Texan argued with Kaiser Wilhelm II; 
he argued in vain and sadly took his train for 
Paris where society was more democratic but 
where all agreed that Berlin held the initiative. 
There w~s little chance of a peace association of 
the greater powers. In London, there was a 
regime dominated by what was then called a 
"wild radical" from Wales, the irresistible 
David Lloyd-George, who meant to re-dis-
tribute the great estates of England among the 
tenants and landless poor of the country. But 
even the most democratic country of the time 
looked to Berlin. In two weeks the secret 
emissary of Woodrow Wilson set foot on Ameri-
can soil at Boston and learned from the news-
papers that Europe was aflame with war- and 
such a war as the world had not known since 
Napoleon I. 
The leaders of the reactionary forces in the 
United States had hardly begun their campaign 
to thwart and break the schoolmaster in Wash-
ington before they found that tariff reforms and 
financial subordination were but bagatelles in 
a world at daggers drawn and ready to buy at 
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top-prices all the foodstuffs of the West and all 
the ammunition of the East, and to borrow all 
the millions the Americans could possibly spare 
at high rates of interest. Great business leaders 
hastened to London and Paris to reap. fortunes 
which eclipsed the greatest fortunes of the Civil 
War. The President proclaimed an absolute 
neutrality; but German, English, and French 
propagandists came in troupes to argue the 
Americans into the belief that each of the parties 
to the great war represented the cause of civiliza-
tion. The leaders of that part of the United 
States closest to Europe in economic interest 
slowly took the English side; the leaders of the 
old South veered more slowly in the same direc-
tion; while the great Middle West preached an 
isolation which a Henry Clay would have 
scorned a hundred years before. Curious fact: 
the owner of a great newspaper syndicate felt 
himself personally unwelcome in London and the 
owners of the greatest mid-Western paper 
thought themselves in similar status with the 
English, and there were millions of Irish and 
German readers of their grievance stories. Wil-
son came first to think of himself as the logical 
arbiter of the mighty contest, though his per-
sonal sympathies were mildly pro-British. He 
did not lose the campaign of 1914 on the old 
tariff issue, as had been expected. Nor did he 
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win enough support to take the initiative in a 
war-mad world. Two years more, and there was 
the coveted national re-election which he won 
on the slogan: "He kept us out of war." But to 
all discerning minds, the United States inust as 
certainly intervene to prevent a German domi-
na tion of modern economic life as England had 
intervened to save Europe from the mastery 
of Napoleon. But that would be a great ad-
vance upon the position of 1898. Would the 
intervention advance the American principles 
of 1776? Would it prove to be another intense 
struggle for the exploi ta tion of weaker peoples? 
After more than one vain effort to bring the 
Germans to a world peace table, the United 
States entered the struggle, expecting that the 
mere weight of her moral influence and economic 
power would determine the outcome. Before 
the end of 1917, it was clear the Germans would 
sweep into Paris and set up guns at Calais 
that would drive every ship off the narrow sea 
if the whole weight of the Government in 
Washington were not cast into the scales. 
Ex-President Taft warned that a million men 
must go across the ocean; Wilson replied: "Why 
not five millions?" In a few months enthusi-
. astic Germans were crossing the ocean to fight 
the soldiers of the Fatherland and equal numbers 
of Irishmen were on the western front helping 
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their age-long enemies from England. Per-
haps both Germans and Irish prayed for the 
defeat of their own allies. It was only another 
form of the entanglements of modern life. But 
the weight of the industrial United States cast 
into the scales against the so-called Central 
Powers brought victory in 1918 to the bellig-
erent Georges Clemenceau, war lord of France, 
and the vociferous Lloyd-George, crying: "The 
Kaiser must be hanged in London." It was not 
a peace without victory; and Wilson must sit in 
person or by means of representatives at the 
final peace table, not as an arbiter as between 
balanced powers, but as one of a group bent 
upon obtaining all the possible fruits of victory. 
The reconstruction of broken Europe would be a 
repetition of the reconstruction of the broken 
South in 1866. But it was a new thing in Ameri-
can history for spokesmen of the United States to 
pass upon the fortunes of Europe and even the 
Far East. It was the end of the second era 
which had begun in 1865. National isolation 
and hypernational policies, both economic and 
political, were obsolete. There was an oppor-
tunity to the new United States with its indus-
trial and financial power surpassing that of all 
the warring powers of Europe-the opportunity 
of a popular and "disinterested friend" deeply 
concerned in the fortunes of mankind in general, 
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as Americans had always professed to be. That 
opportunity consisted in the grant to the Presi-
dent of an unquestioned mandate as he departed 
for the Paris conference. With such a mandate 
the world might have been made "safe for 
democracy" and the reconstruction of Europe 
might have proceeded without the usual injus-
tices and hatreds. The seizure of the great 
opportunity depended on the ability of the 
leaders, rather than the masses, to realize that 
a new world and a new United States were in 
the making. The day of privilege and exploita-
tion was about to close; but the beneficaries of 
privilege and exploitation could not read the 
signs of the time. One has but to read the pro-
ceedings of the American Chamber of Com-
merce in December, 1918, to see this. 
The allied governments owed the United 
States about eleven billion dollars and the peo-
ples and corporations of the same countries 
owed American banks . and corporations hun-
dreds of millions more. If the Germans paid 
the allies the damages their armies had done as 
the French had been compelled to do in 1871, 
all their profits for half a century would be pre-
empted. Nor was this all: the Government of 
the United States owed its people twenty-five 
billions while the governments of all the warring 
powers owed their peoples sums surpassing the 
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total movable wealth of their countries prior 
to August, 1914. The world had been in many 
serious economic plights. It had never been so 
completely bankrupt at any preceding moment 
in history. These were facts that informed men 
in the United States ought to have understood. 
They should have shown men everywhere that 
there could no longer be economic isolation, 
constitutions and national prices to the con-
trary notwithstanding. But as the congres-
sional election of 1918 approached, it was plain 
that the opposition to the great schoolmaster 
was coralling with solid blocs the natural race 
groups deeply angered at a President for whom 
they had voted because he had kept them out of 
a war and yet had sent their sons to fight on the 
western front. The Germans, the Irish, and 
many thousands of Negroes, carried North to 
work during the critical years 1917-18, voted 
against the mandate needed if Germany, Ire-
land, and even the Negroes were to be made 
secure in the new world peace. I t was the usual 
case of men voting their past grievances and 
losing their present objectives. The election 
gave the older tariff and financial masters a new 
(perhaps their last) control in Washington; and 
Wilson went to Paris without a mandate. 
Every other representative in the conference 
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had his country behind him. All the world 
knows the treaty that followed. 
It was the revival of the hypernationalisms 
which had developed from the work of. Cavour, 
Lincoln and Bismarck; and every great nation 
seized what advantage it could, although Poland 
and the little Balkan countries did obtain doubt-
ful guarantees of such independence as they 
might maintain in a world still acting in the 
ancient spirit of war. The one hope of the future 
in 1920 consisted in the chance that leaders like 
Taft and Root would join Wilson and put the 
United States into the new association of na-
tions permitted by the Treaty of Versailles, an 
association not unlike that which Washington 
had worked out in 1788. The scores of rival, 
jealous peoples of the modern world must unite 
in some economic co-operation if debts were 
ever to be paid and good will among recent 
enemies restored. The United States was the 
greatest creditor of all. Its industrial-financial 
structure was the greatest of all and the temper 
of its people was the least bitter. If the future 
was to be secure, Washington leaders would of 
necessity have to point the way. The per-
verted constitution of Mason, Franklin, and 
Jefferson would have to be stretched to cover the 
welfare of mankind, or the United States would 
lose its leadership, its lawful debts, and many 
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billions tied into its capital structure. It was 
time for a world Washington. Could there be 
such a leader? 
The opportunity for party advantage was too 
great. Although Taft, Hughes, Hoover and a 
score of other eminent chiefs endeavored to 
swing the Republicans into a forward-looking 
position, the years which followed the election 
of 1920 were years of hopeless backward-looking, 
of exaggerated nationalism, false appeals to the 
teachings of the "fathers of 1788." Never has 
the history of a country been more misunder-
stood or dangerously interpreted. For twelve 
years; the driving word was distrust of other 
peoples; and distrust begets distrust. 
A President even more ignorant than the most 
ignoran t of his predecessors held office for a 
while; and the record of his neglect, if not cor-
ruption, surpasses the record of any preceding 
leader of the country. Another and a little 
better informed chief came to office in 1923 
and was reelected in 1924; but no enlightened 
leadership followed. The enforcement of : the 
Federal Reserve Banking Law was relaxed. 
The warnings of declining commodity prices of 
the period were ignored. Immigration from 
other lands was as good as prohibited; and the 
tariff act of 1922 reduced the exports of industry 
when the home market approached saturation. 
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Isola tion, political and economic, was the slogan; 
yet everybody called for the prompt payment 
of the eleven billions of allied war debt in gold. 
It was a legal obligation, as the obligation of 
young America to pay the impossible debt of 
1783 had been legal and binding. The allies 
resorted to borrowing in the United States in 
order to pay; and the Germans likewise borrowed 
from the same sources to enable them to pay 
the allies. Since European industry might not 
sell its output to advantage in the United States, 
its chiefs borrowed money from American banks 
to enable them to sell in Latin-American mar-
kets in competition with the United States. 
At the same time the Administrations of Hard-
ing and Coolidge loudly asserted their right to 
dominate Latin-America, and thus added to the 
small advantages of European industry and the 
unpopularity of the "monster of the North." 
Secretary of State Hughes frankly told the 
assembled Latin-Americans in Havana in 1926 
that the Monroe Doctrine, hated everywhere 
south of the Rio Grande, was a purely United 
States affair and was to be applied exactly as 
the Government in Washington saw fit: purely 
"unilateral." It was the Austrian attitude of 
1914 toward the Balkan States. 
Thus, instead of moving into new paths as 
Washington had done in 1787-88 and Lincoln 
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had repeated in 1861, the leaders of the United 
States faced backward from 1921 to 1929, 
ignoring the most obvious economic and social 
facts. There were no more free lands; and 
moreover, if the dispossessed farmers of the 
era had known of free lands, they would not 
have accepted them. For three decades the 
schools and colleges had taught their young, 
both by precept and by example, that life in the 
city was the only life worth living. There were 
everywhere great University departments which 
taught hundreds of thousands the charms of 
industry and the art of super-salesmanship. 
Six hundred thousand country folk abandoned 
their homes for the city each year during the 
larger portion of this period. There were few 
immigrants from other countries; and what there 
were lingered in the cities, arousing the anger 
of organized labor. With no free lands and few 
immigrants, the native population ceased to 
increase as in times past. Women did not care 
to bear children. They disliked the drudgery 
of the household and so apartments, hotels 
and chain restaurants became the craze. Few 
were willing to be caught at the old-fashioned 
tasks; the family was a declining factor in life. 
Nor were conditions in Europe better. Al-
though ten million men had been killed and as 
many more disabled for life, there were appar-
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ently still too many people. The unemployed 
crowded into the cities. Having fought vali-
antly in the great war, governments could 
hardly decline to feed and clothe them in time 
of peace; but the more help governments gave, 
the greater the demand for help. In times past 
the poor and unemployed of England and Ger-
many had migrated to the United States, 
Canada, Australia and Argentina. Now im-
migrants were, as we have seen, unwelcome, nor 
were the unemployed of Europe willing to mi-
grate to the far borders of civilization. They 
loved the lights and noises of great cities, even 
when they begged their daily bread. Much, if 
not most, of the personal self-respect .of the 
eighteenth century had gone, disappeared in the 
era of industrialism. It was a curious reaction-
ary state of mind: "All men are entitled to sup-
port from their fellows." 
With the advent of Herbert Hoover as Presi-
dent, there was a leadership more familiar with 
the adventures of the mining camp and the 
manipulations of stock markets than with the 
traditions and the complications of the United 
States. The "great engineer" was utterly una-
ware of the dangers ahead of him. University 
professors talked of the certain disappearance 
of poverty; United States chambers of commerce 
preached the same doctrine, apparently unaware 
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of the fact that half the farmer folk of the na-
tion were hardly able to earn their keep. On 
account of mass production methods, American 
industry was still able to sell certain goods in 
other countries; the declining home market was 
steadily boosted by super-salesmanship and the 
deceptive propaganda that machine farming 
would work a new era, even while tariffs were 
operating adversely; and to support all this, 
credit was everywhere granted on the easiest of 
terms. It is difficult to imagine the perform-
ances of the Coolidge-Hoover years. Two great 
utility super-organizations, one in the East, the 
other in the West, pulled into their control 
nearly all the electric power concerns of the 
country. A small Virginia lighting system, 
built by amateurs and even farmers, was paid 
ten times its own valuation in stocks issued by 
a subsidiary company of a subsidiary company 
of Samuel Insull, the London newsboy grown to 
be autocrat of Chicago. The greatest banks of 
the country became interested in the super-
salesmanship of billions of such stocks. The 
Shenandoah River was to be dammed and a vast 
stretch of that charming region was to be cov-
ered in water in order to perfect the control of 
ancient Virginia by Chicago "undertakers." 
The urban world having gone half-mad with 
movie entertainment, subsidiary concerns of the 
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General Electric Company of the East orga-
nized affiliates for the building and control of 
the movie houses and, under one cover, issued 
stocks to the amount of sixty-eight million dol-
lars. These were taken at fifty dollars each by 
a public, unwarned by their own bank officials, 
state or national. Later the agent of the sell-
ing company set up a "short sale" campaign on 
the stock exchanges and reduced their fifty-
dollar shares to seventy-five cents each. The 
public lost about sixty millions. The very 
eminent and humane chief of these operations 
thought himself, as others also thought, fit 
successor to George Washington; great business 
leaders hailed him as a master magician of high 
integrity. Anything might be done in New 
York. Since Chicago and other plains cities 
had built themselves skyscrapers like those of 
the McKinley-Roosevelt days, the masters of 
Manhattan now dynamited vast foundations 
in their solid rock subsoil and erected business 
structures thirty, fifty, and a hundred stories 
high--offices, movie houses, and radio cities to 
meet the demands of half a hundred years to 
come. Everything had to be on Manhattan 
Island and everybody in the United States must 
see the vast complex or die in provincial ig-
norance. The subways, the surface lines and 
the overheads, not to mention the thousands of 
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cabs, carried vast masses of people at unprece-
dented speed in and out of the city every day. 
To finance these buildings, transportation lines 
and racketeering politicians, the country was 
taxed through the sales of enormous bond and 
stock issues, payable ten, twenty and fifty years 
hence. Nearly everybody fell for these specu-
lations, and most people thought themselves 
unfortunate if they could not live in some 
elaborate house or apartment in New York or 
some other "modern city." It was the Coolidge-
Hoover age and the Empire State Building was 
its monument-today standing half empty and 
begging sightseers to spend their half dollars 
just to take a ride in the elevators. And what 
New York did, Richmond or Kansas City, with 
vast stretches of land all about them, must do. 
There had never been such an era; and nearly 
all Americans shouted: "Grea t is the age of 
. passing poverty." 
And parallel to this was the unhindered ac-
cumula tion of nearly all the earnings of the 
country in a few centres. The comptroller of 
the currency paid less attention than ever before 
to the limiting clauses of the Federal Reserve 
Act. Banks set up affiliates to do what they 
might not do in their own names. · Associa-
tions of banks sent agents to Germany in 1926 
to lend hundreds of millions, even billions of 
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credit, at high rates and on poor security; and 
then co-opera ted in the boosting of the sales of 
these German bonds to their clients at a profit. 
A somewhat different loaning system was ap-
plied to Latin-American countries. But whether 
bankrupt Europe or doubtful Spanish America 
wished huge loans, the means were found to 
meet the wish and the government officials 
failed under the constitutions of 1787 and 1865 
to warn the people against putting their savings 
into the great hopper. Perhaps ten billions in 
addition to the eleven billions due the Govern-
ment were thus disposed of for slips of paper 
without proper guarantees of their value. It 
was the proceeds of these loans that enabled poor 
foreigners to pay for American automobiles, 
typewriters and other machines-a false appear-
ance of prosperity soon to become obvious to all. 
And while the new and amazing performances 
of electric magicians, skyscraper builders and 
foreign credit lenders operated day and night to 
manipulate the bewildered masses, the older con-
cerns of the country fell into line. General 
Motors poured more and more stocks onto the 
market; the railroads, never quite free of water-
ing their securities, added immensely to their 
obligations; and steel companies, cement manu-
facturers and even rural bankers gladly tied 
themselves into the dangerous structure. Nicho-
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las Biddle had never imagined such gullibility 
of his public. Nor might one safely criticize or 
warn. If one said railroad securities were one-
third water or that the electric power holding 
companies were due for a fall, the great officials 
of semi-sacred insurance organizations would 
cry: "Bolshevism." Thus the hundred billions 
of worthless stocks must continue to float, lest 
the reserve investments of the country be called 
into question. I t was a case of certain wreck if 
the process went on, of vast disaster if it stopped. 
One of the candidates for the nomination to 
the Presidency in 1932 wrote in a letter as yet 
unpublished: "The time has come for business 
men to take over the constitution and apply 
it. We must be governed from the top and 
all other elements of American life must be 
subordinated and fitted into the picture, other-
wise there is chaos." Nor was the suggestion 
so far from the fact. Five hundred men re-
ceived a million dollars a year income and from 
the Morgan revelations one may surmise that a 
thousand others received similar incomes but 
failed to report them for taxation. Bethlehem 
Steel directors voted themselves bonuses of a 
million dollars each for their fine management 
and North Carolina tobacco manufacturers 
were hardly less liberal with themselves. 
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Nor was the structure badly fitted together. 
United States Steel products sold all over the 
country at the same prices, twice as high as in 
1914. A drill, a mower or an automobile was 
everywhere the same thing and agents were com-
manded to sell so many a year or lose their jobs-
the price always the same. And if farmers and 
country folk could not pay, they were allowed to 
advance ten dollars, receive the article and then 
pay regularly the next two or three years when 
the car or binder might be well-nigh worthless. 
High-power salesmanship. But while all prices 
of stabilized industrial goods in the United 
Sta tes were fixed by industrial committees or 
single autocrats like Henry Ford, the rest of the 
world might have the same article at lower rates. 
The so-called Webb law of 1918 allowed Ameri-
can manufacturers to fix prices abroad low or 
high in order, like the German cartel system of 
1914, to break down competition. The great 
home structure rested secure upon the protected 
home market. At the same time it set itself the 
task of lending money abroad in order that 
foreigners might buy American raw materials 
and compete with their own industrialists. It 
was a marvelous development of the democracy 
set up in 1787. 
[ 62 ] 
VI. 
Such was the artificial world of 1929 tottering 
under the accumulative grievances of the Ameri-
can people and the angry-minded states of Eu-
rope, hardly able to see that the Treaty of 
Versailles, good or bad, was a world economic-
military constitution, not unlike that of 1783 
or 1763. If the structure of the Coolidge-Hoover 
prosperity were to stand, the League of Nations 
must be made the centre piece of the hated 
treaty and there must be an imaginative leader-
ship not unlike that which wove together the 
thirteen jealous and quarrelsome American states 
of 1787. There must be some solution of the 
tariff problems growing more acute every year; 
and emigration from overcrowded countries 
must be accommodated somewhere in a vastly 
undeveloped world. In the United States the 
drift to the cities must be deflected to less de-
veloped regions like the old South or far South-
west. If there were no longer free lands, there 
was cheap land. The world must get together, 
not to make ready for another war in which all 
would be lost; but to keep the peace. The 
great day for that had been in 1920. But hav-
ing failed then, there was a possibility in 1929. 
But the new President called a congress com-
mitted to backward trends. Instead of leading 
its unruly members, he permitted them to 
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wrangle a half year about tariff advantages for 
individual, party and sectional interests. In-
stead of striking a vigorous hand into the Euro-
pean tangle, he trusted to the fa tuous Young 
Plan as a cover under which Germany and 
France might settle their economic differences. 
While talking of everlasting prosperity, the solid 
rock foundations under New York suddenly 
gave way in October, 1929. When the New 
York stock market collapsed, the New York 
bankers trembled. When the New York bank-
ers trembled the gods of the system were dis-
credited. Anybody might criticize; and every-
body indulged himself freely. The President did 
nothing. Congress slowly enacted a tariff which 
all thoughtful men knew to be both wrong and 
economically dangerous. The President signed 
the bill and hoped for prosperity, unaware that 
high tariffs require immigration and free lands 
in order to be highly effective. Prosperity was 
not just around the corner. All Europe fell 
into a worse plight than before. Little buying 
anywhere could be expected. Installment sales-
manship collapsed at home. The banks began 
to fail. Some of the truth of the situation slowly 
seeped into business men's minds and many of 
them committed suicide rather than confess 
their sins or attempt to reconstruct their social 
order. In 1932 stock values had fallen about a 
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hundred billions; the railroads were bankrupt 
and begging Government . to save them; the 
insurance authorities were uneasy day and night 
lest the world know how little value there was in 
their "immense reserves;" and there were twelve 
million people out of employment, gathering 
more and more in the cities where they de-
manded the right to work in a world that needed 
fewer workers every year, a world with a rela-
tively decreasing population. Had George Ma-
son or Alexander Hamilton been right in 1787? 
The system had collapsed and the tendency in 
every section of the country was toward a more 
and more primitive life. If nothing were done, 
peasantry for farmers, like that of Europe since 
time immemorial, and proletarianism for the 
city masses, like that of ancient Rome, would 
be hastened. The old constitution must be 
made new and no constitution could be made 
successful without many and intimate con-
tacts with the industrial world everywhere. To 
accomplish so great a change among a people 
taught to move in contrary directions by their 
politicians, their race group leaders and the 
schools, high and low, would be little short of 
miraculous; yet miracles are sometimes wrought. 
The object, avowed and unavowed, of the 
electoral campaign of 1932 was to work the 
miracle. 
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To work it, some heroic measure must be 
intelligently applied. The first of these is the 
acceptance of the fact that securities without 
real value behind them must be gradually 
written off, even when millions of · innocent 
purchasers must suffer. Railroads, so important 
to a modern state, mus(cease to pay dividends 
or interests on paper values. That means 
four to five billions of deflation and permanent 
release of some hundreds of thousands of workers. 
Insurance companies that hold hundreds of 
millions of watered securities must recognize 
the fact and seek some way to meet the proper 
demands upon them-a hard conclusion which 
involves the fortunes of millions of people. With 
railroads and insurance companies and labor 
relations readjusted, the artificial produce and 
food markets of the cities must be freed from 
their "exaggerated overheads" under which 
worthless securities have been issued to the 
people. If competition amorig commission mer-
chants and distributing agencies can not be 
established, then little dictatorships will have 
to be set up. Farmers can not function in a 
society which requires consumers of milk to pay 
ten cents a quart and leaves the producer only 
three cents a quart. Apples at a dollar a barrel 
in the orchard and ten dollars a barrel to the 
consumer represent an injustice almost unprece-
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dented. There must be some equalization as 
between the masses of producers and the masses 
of urban consumers, else there can be little 
margin of returns on which the purchase of 
industrial goods depends. If these things be 
done, something like a third of the city popula-
tions will find themselves unnecessary. The 
most perfect labor organizations in the world 
can not overbear the great facts of life. These 
superfluous workers in the mills, in the political 
gangs and in the offices of magnificent sky-
scrapers, like their predecessors of Europe in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, will 
find places on the cheap lands of the South and 
West. And, like their predecessors, their success 
will depend upon their initiative and their 
courage to meet a hard situation. Unlike the 
governments in times past, the governments of 
today stand ready to lend aid. And one only 
needs to read the reports of the proceedings of 
the Banking Committee of the Senate today to 
see what must happen to financial and industrial 
leaders who have conspired together for decades 
to exploit the public. With these difficult 
domestic changes under way, an equally diffi-
cult task presses from abroad. 
The billions of money due the United States, 
both public and private, can not be promptly 
repaid. The great war, due to industrial rival-
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ries and historic hatreds, left a burden which can 
no more be lifted than the Americans of 1787 
could repay in gold the millions of paper dollars 
which had been accepted in good faith on the 
word of as able and honest public men as ever 
served any country. The most of the world 
public debt simply has to be written off, like 
the worthless industrial securities of the United 
States payable in 1980. When this is done, the 
hostile trade barriers must be reduced, if not 
broken down. These barriers are due more to 
the teaching and example of the United States 
than to the influence of European statesmen. 
The United States must, therefore, take the 
lead in correcting the evil. When debts are 
adjudicated and trade barriers are lowered, there 
will remain the third and last great task, the 
reduction of costly armaments. 
These are the greater leads on the way to the 
new world, the new United States operating 
under the reinterpreted constitution of Wash-
ington arid his fellows. The minor problems 
may be worked out more slowly. But it must 
be a new world, a new attitude toward consti-
tutions and a recognition that privileged groups 
always work their own ruin, if not regulated by 
government; and working their own ruin, they 
work that of their fellows in vast numbers. 
The United States have gone a long way since 
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1865, a longer way since 1787; but a vaster future 
is still before us and the principle of democracy 
is as vital today as in 1776. 
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